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Section 1: Introduction
Despite that the potential for insider trading appears to be of significant concern to investors and regulators alike, it is an empirical fact that executives receive large fractions of their compensation in the form of tradable securities. This paper attempts to provide insights into the demand for disclosures when management due to the nature of their compensation is put in a position that arguably invites insider trading. Any contract based on tradable securities can always be replicated with nontradable securities that would give the employer tighter control on the incentives and trading activities of the employee. As providing managers with instruments that can be traded opens up for both the possibilities that a manager will take advantage of uninformed outsiders and that he, by reducing the risk component of his contract, may weaken the incentives he was supposed to have, the popularity of tradable securities for purposes of compensation is in itself an interesting issue. Indeed, it seems paradoxical to compensate employees with tradable securities only to impose restrictions that prohibit them from taking advantage of the tradability feature. In this paper, however, I take the tradability of the compensation package for granted and concentrate on the role of disclosure requirements in alleviating the two problems identified above.
The key policy issue that I am interested in here is whether or not managers that hold tradable securities must disclose ahead of time their intentions to trade (sell in particular) thereby revealing at least a portion of their private information, or if it could actually be preferable to allow them to take full advantage of the tradability feature by trading anonymously. Indeed, I demonstrate in my model that it is actually better, both in terms of real production, and in a Pareto sense, to allow the manager under certain parameter values to take full advantage of the tradability feature of his compensation and, thus, engage in insider trading. Current accounting debates revolve around the argument that there should be regulation for companies to publicly disclose management shareholdings, stock options as well as any change in the holdings of top management. This paper addresses this issue by showing that there are certain situations where allowing executive shareholdings to be private information may increase the productivity of the manager.
In order to analyze the tradability feature of compensation packages, I employ the general framework of the principal-agent model with the possibility of "renegotiation." In particular, the model I utilize is closely related to the model of Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) . In the full commitment literature, the principal and the agent write a long-term contract to which they are bound with no possibility of change. The principal and the agent interact only with one another and the market is ignored in the problem. Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) allow the principal and the agent the possibility of changing the initial contract once effort has been exerted. Changes occur only if no party is made worse off, and at least one party is strictly better off. In the renegotiation case, one important point to note is that there is a central principal that conducts the renegotiation. This means that there is what I will term as a "strong principal" that offers the agent the possibility to renegotiate his contract in a take it or leave it fashion. The research parallels the framework of Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) where they show due to renegotiation the principal cannot induce high effort as a pure non-degenerate strategy; rather the agent randomizes between high and low effort with a certain probability, which creates an inefficiency. I extend Fudenberg and Tirole's (1990) existing framework in two ways.
First, a key feature of the model that I analyze is that it makes formal that, trading initiated by the agent is analogous to renegotiation of the contract. In this paper, I attempt to model the situation that is more descriptive of publicly traded companies, that is, that of diffused ownership, where the firm is owned by several atomistic shareholders who are the residual claimants of the firm. As each "principal"
only owns a claim to the residual value of the firm, it is natural to assume that each "principal" does not own or control a sufficiently large fraction of the firm himself to be able to offer to renegotiate with the agent. I term this situation of diffused ownership as having "weak principals." Hence in the model that I present the only option for the agent to "renegotiate" the contract that he is originally offered is to trade with the market. That is, the agent can reduce his risk-exposure only by selling at prevailing (equilibrium) market prices some or all of the tradable securities with which he was initially endowed.
Second, in the Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) model the only information asymmetry is the agent's action choice, that is, information generated endogenously within the firm. Exogenous factors such as market prices are ignored. This paper attempts to include such exogenous information in the renegotiation process. With the possibility of renegotiation, it is feasible to consider that the agent can bring in information from his interaction with the market after the initial contract is signed.
Market interactions can be of many types, but the particular one that I would like to focus on is insider trading of the tradable component of the agent's compensation.
This particular type of market interaction allows me to introduce additional information asymmetries in the model by allowing the agent the possibility of interacting with the market and trading into a position without first informing the principal. Hence, in my model the agent may have superior information about his action choice as well as his trading activities.
I show that in my model if the agent is compensated with tradable securities, the economy as a whole can be better off if the agent is allowed to engage in (unobservable) insider trading. Indeed as I also show, the setting where an agent facing "weak principals," modifies his contract by engaging in undisclosed insider trading may actually perform better than the setting of Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) where a "strong principal" is in control of re-contracting. This particular result hints at a potential (economic) reason for the popularity of tradable securities in compensation packages (which I explore further in the second paper of this thesis).
The key Pareto improvement in this model comes from an increase in expected production. More precise, an agent faced with a choice between a low and a high productivity action will choose to take the high one with a higher probability.
The intuition for this result follows from the fact that when the agent "renegotiates"
his compensation with the market, the market maker, knowing that there are traders trading on private information, induces a bid-ask spread that makes trading on private information less beneficial. In equilibrium, if the agent has taken the high-cost action, he prefers to hold on to his shares whereas if he taken the low-cost action he is indifferent between holding and selling all his shares. The market maker knows that inside trading occurs only on the sell side of the market. Hence by imposing a large enough spread, the market maker can insure himself of the losses he will incur by buying from insiders. Due to the fact that there is only inside selling, the market maker can set the ask price at the true conditional value of the firm. As a result of having to sustain the increased ask price the incentives for taking the high-cost action are increased. Hence, in equilibrium, the agent takes the high-cost action with a greater probability.
The main result of the paper shows that by including an additional source of information asymmetry through the mechanism of insider trading, the probability of high effort in certain situations is greater than in situations without this additional information asymmetry. This seemingly counterintuitive result provides one possible explanation for why companies which have diffused ownership include tradable securities as part of executive compensation packages. Indeed, the model helps us understand that allowing for insider trading in firms that have diffused ownership in some cases is beneficial to the owners of the company as the probability of high effort exerted by the manager is higher than in a regime where management's intent to trade has to be disclosed. Hence in these situations the owners would prefer a regime that does not require disclosure of management's trading activities.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the background of the existing literature on insider trading, empirical and theoretical. Section 3.1 lays out the framework of the contract that the "weak principals" (firm) offer the agent in a simple setting where there are two possible outcomes and two possible levels of effort for the agent. Section 3.2 explains the structure of the market that exists for trading in the shares of the firm. Section 3.3 explicitly lays out the time line of the model.
Section 4 gives the theoretical foundations of the model used in this paper. It highlights the important results of the paper by Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) . Section 5 provides the analysis of the model. Section 5.1 explains why the Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) model is an appropriate benchmark for the one I analyze. Section 5.1 derives the agent's expected utility and sets up an artificial benchmark where the market maker does not impose a spread in order to respond to the adverse selection in the market. The production generated in this artificially constructed benchmark is then ranked against the production generated in the Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) model. Lastly, in section 5.3 I analyze a regime where the market maker responds to the information asymmetry in the market by imposing a spread. The production generated in this final set-up is then compared to the artificial benchmark and to the Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) model. Section 6 concludes the paper and offers some implications for accounting research, especially in the area of structuring of compensation packages and accounting regulation related to disclosure of insider trading.
Related Literature on Insider Trading
In this section I provide a brief overview of both the existing empirical and theoretical literatures that have examined insider trading. The empirical literature on the whole looks at the capital market effects such as and market reactions caused by insider trading especially changes in the stock price. The theoretical literature on insider trading can be divided into two main strands -one strand explains the capital market effects of insider trading while the other strand looks at theoretical explanations for allowing managers to trade on their private information. This paper attempts to contribute to the second strand of theoretical literature. It attempts to give another theoretical explanation for the existence of insider trading through a limited commitment principal-agent model where the agent is compensated with tradable securities.
There exists a lot of debate around the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulation of insider trading. Proponents of insider trading regulations argue that insider trading is harmful because it leads to (i) a loss of liquidity in the market,
(ii) perverse managerial incentives, and (iii) a perception of unfairness and loss of investor confidence in capital markets (see Glosten (1989) , Easterbrook (1985) , Brudney (1979) , Douglas (1988) and Manove (1989) ). Supporters of insider trading cite various social benefits associated with insider trading. One prominent argument is that trading by insiders with superior information leads to more informationally efficient stock prices. This is because insider trading helps security prices adjust more rapidly to reflect underlying information, hence increasing market efficiency and resulting in more real investment. Other arguments that have been cited are that insider trading provides a meaningful form of compensation in large corporations for the entrepreneurial function; therefore it is an effective way of stimulating entrepreneurial activities (see Manne (1966) and Young (1985) ). The main point in these articles favoring insider trading is that the social benefit of more efficient prices is a more efficient allocation of resources. Wu (1964) , Lee and Solt (1986) have found no indication that insiders performed better than other traders. On the contrary, Jaffe (1974 ( ), Penman (1982 , Seyhun (1986) have found that insiders earned abnormal returns by trading on their privileged information. One of the major drawbacks of these empirical studies has been the lack of a control variable, hence, it is difficult to determine 1. the nature and quality level of the inside information 2. precisely which traders directly or indirectly possess inside information.
Three recent empirical studies by Meulbroek (1992), Cornell and Siri (1992) and Chakravarty and McConnell (1997) imply that insider trading leads to more rapid price discovery. These papers show that insider trading corrects prices significantly and in the right direction. All three papers use detailed data on trading by illegally informed insiders where the insider is a buyer. All three papers also use a measure of insider trading to estimate the impact of such trading on stock prices. Meulbroek (1992) uses an indicator variable to identify the days in which insider trading occurred. Cornell and Siri (1992) compute the fraction of total daily volume attributable to insiders, and Chakravarty and McConnell (1997) use daily and hourly insider trading volume. All the authors conclude that insider trading is significantly correlated with stock price run-ups implying that insider trades affect price discovery differently than non-insider (uninformed) trades. In a related paper Chakravarty and McConnell (1999) using the case study of Boesky's purchase of Carnation's stock
show that the effects of insider trading and non-insider trading (in the same direction) are statistically indistinguishable.
Another stream of empirical literature focuses on the impact of legal trades by corporate insiders on stock prices (Jaffe (1974) , Sehyun (1986) , Eckbo and Smith (1998) , Sehyun (1992a Sehyun ( ), (1992b and Ke, Huddart and Pettroni (2003) ). These studies show that insiders tend to buy before an abnormal rise in stock prices and sell before an abnormal decline. Sehyun (1992a) finds compelling evidence that insider trading volume, frequency, and profitability all increased significantly during the 1980s. Over the decade, he documents that insiders earned over 5% abnormal returns on average. Sehyun (1992b) determines that insider trades predict up to 60% of the variation in year-ahead returns. Accordingly he concludes that insider trading continues to be an economically important phenomenon. Ke, Huddart and Pettroni (2003) Karpoff and Lee (1991) at seasoned equity offerings, Lee et al (1992) at stock repurchases and Sehyun (1990) at takeover bids.
There are several theoretical papers such as Diamond and Verrecchia (1981) , Douglas (1988) , Grossman (1976) , Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Hellwig (1980) , Kyle (1985) , Manne (1966) , Radner (1979) , and Young (1985) that show that insider trading is unfair to ordinary traders if those who trade on inside information obtain significantly larger profits than those expected. Grossman (1976) viewed stock prices as aggregating various kinds of information. Radner (1979) proposed efficiency of information; his model included the possibility of different traders possessing different knowledge. Hellwig (1980) showed that common information elements would be reflected in prices and that "noise" would be filtered out. Diamond and Verrecchia (1981) , Kyle (1985) and Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) showed that prices only partially reflect the diverse sources of information that traders possess. Manne (1966) and Young (1985) in their papers also give positive opinions and show that permitting insider trading would make the market more efficient and liquid, hence stimulating market investment while compensating the entrepreneurial function in large companies.
This paper is closely related to a theoretical paper by Dye (1984) , where he analyzes shareholders' incentives to sanction insider trading. Dye's paper differs from this one as he uses a multiple principal-single agent model with full commitment where he establishes improved risk-sharing as one of the reasons shareholders would want to allow the manager to trade on his private information. In his paper the desirability of insider trading depends on the distributional relationships among the inside information held by management, the manager's effort, and the output of the firm that employs him. The model uses the assumption that the private information of the manager is so informative that the realized value of output contains no information about the manager's actions not contained in the manager's private signal. Providing the right incentives to the manager to reveal his private information truthfully leads to the improved risk-sharing result that drives the gain from allowing insider trading. The benefit of offering a menu to the manager only exists if the manager's private information is not independent of the realized output. On the other hand, this paper establishes gains to trading on private information in a limited commitment model where due to diffused ownership, like the Dye model, there are multiple principals. But these principals own only a small fraction of the firm, and hence do not own or control a sufficiently large fraction so as to be able to renegotiate with the agent. Hence in my model, the only option for the agent to renegotiate his original contract is to trade in the market. Unlike the Dye model, the benefit from insider trading is from increased production, while risk-sharing in the contract remains the same as in the full commitment literature. In my model, similar to Dye's (1984) the manager's trades are observable ex-post after the markets are closed but before compensation is paid to the manager, which is consistent with insider reporting requirements specified in section 16(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.
In a related theoretical paper, Dow and Rahi (2003) show another benefit to allowing insider trading. They study the welfare economics of informed stock market trading. Their model shows that a greater degree of informed trading reduces the returns to speculation. They also prove that greater revelation of information that agents wish to insure against leads to a reduction in hedging opportunities, but early revelation that is uncorrelated with hedging needs allows agents to construct better hedges. They demonstrate an important welfare gain due to the existence of insider trading. Their main result intuitively stems from the fact that informed trading increases investment efficiency, even though it entails higher volatility of the share price and of investment. This paper discusses another social benefit of insider trading -production efficiency gains. But, this paper has a counter-intuitive result. The
Pareto improvement in this model comes from an increase in information asymmetry which causes greater market inefficiencies by increasing the spread in prices. As there is only inside selling in the market, the ask price is set at the unconditional value of the firm. To support this increase in the ask price, the agent exerts the high-cost action with higher probability, which in turn makes the overall economy better off.
Hence the production efficiency gains in my model come from increasing the market inefficiencies whereas the economic benefits in Dow and Rahi (2003) comes from a decrease in market inefficiencies.
Model of the Firm
To study the implications of allowing for undisclosed insider trading and, in turn, providing a meaningful role for tradable securities in compensation packages, I
analyze an extension of the Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) I examine a discrete model where the agent has only two levels of effort to choose from; high or low } , { l h a a a ∈ . The choice of effort, in turn, affects the expected value of the firm by altering the probability distribution over final output to be realized, observed, and shared at the end of the game. Realized output is denoted
where L H > , and the probability of outcome H when the agent chooses
By assumption, l h p p > . The agent's utility function is assumed additively separable in utility for consumption, represented by the strictly increasing and concave function ) (⋅ U defined over the entire real line, and dis-utility for "effort." For notational simplicity the cost of the low effort is normalized to zero while the (incremental) cost of high effort is represented by 0 > C . As in the Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) model, I will assume that the value of the high output and the effect of the agent's effort on the probability that it materializes are so large that the principal wants to implement the high effort whenever possible. The probability of high effort induced by the randomization result
As the key focus of my analysis is on the economic consequences of insider trading, I assume that the agent has claims to the terminal (net) output of the firm. As usual, the contract between the principal and the agent can be written on what is observable, that is x , as well as on any messages the agent may choose to convey to the principal prior to the end of the game. In the benchmark setting of Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) the only private information the agent can (and does) communicate is the choice of effort. In the case considered here where the agent can (and does) alter his exposure to the firm through market transactions, he may also be induced to disclose his trading activities. Hence, the message space of the agent in this case includes his effort level and his trading activity.
Given the focus on insider trading it is useful to express the contract between the principal and the agent in terms of a cash component, denoted by } *, { B . This assumption is consistent with the reasoning that the market in the firm's shares closes before compensation is paid to the agent, which is consistent with insider trading reporting requirements specified in section 16(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, and hence the trading of the manager are revealed to the principal. It is similar to the assumption made in the paper by Dye (1984) .
The risky part of the contract at the beginning of the game consists of * δ shares in the firm. If insider trading occurs, the agent purchases ψ shares in the open market at the ask price denoted by ASK or sells as many as * δ shares in the open market at the bid price denoted by BID . In the model, I assume that insiders are not allowed to short-sell 2 . The contract must be constructed such that the agent trades in such a manner that at the end of the period an agent who took h a holds * δ shares of the firm, where * δ is the fraction of the firm held by an agent facing a full commitment optimal contract which is the contract that is incentive compatible with that action. If the agent is given * δ shares by the principal, in the equilibrium renegotiation-proof contract, the agent who took h a should never choose to purchase or sell shares. After the agent has chosen his effort and traded accordingly, the contract also must be individually rational such that the agent is indifferent between the expected utility from high and low effort and, thus, willing to randomize between them with a probabilityσ .
In this paper I do not attempt to characterize the optimal contract that is awarded to the agent. As the risk-sharing between the principal and the agent in my model is the same as that in Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) , I can rank the contracts in terms of the production they generate. In this paper, I establish that when the agent is compensated with tradable securities and allowed to trade them anonymously, under certain parameter values, I can push out the Pareto frontier as benchmarked against Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) . If this contract that may or may not be optimal can demonstrate an increase in production, then this result will hold true for an optimal contract.
Model of the Market
This section explains the market structure imposed in the model in order to analyze the price at which the agent can trade his shares in the market. Similar to Glosten and Milgrom (1985) , I assume that there exists a single monopolistic riskneutral market maker in the market. The market maker is uninformed and faces an adverse selection problem, as there are informed traders and liquidity traders in the market. Assume that the number of liquidity traders in the market equals L , made up of S L liquidity sellers and B L liquidity buyers. To solve the problem of asymmetric information, caused by informed traders who in this case are agents who have already exerted effort, the market maker quotes a bid and ask price.
I assume that the market maker does not observe the order flow before setting competitive bid (sell) and ask (buy) prices and therefore he has an expected profit of zero in each period, which implies that the market maker cannot cross-subsidize over 
Theoretical Foundations of the Model
In this section I highlight the important features of the Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) model and then go on to explain in the next section why their model provides as an appropriate benchmark for the one I consider. Analyzing the Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) model allows me to look at how trading by the agent effects production.
Specifically, the agent trading his contract with the market is analogous to allowing the agent to renegotiate his contract. In the Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) The model in the Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) paper is structured such that the principal and the agent write a contract after which the agent exerts effort. At the next stage, that is, once the effort is sunk, the principal (in this case a "strong principal") offers to renegotiate the contract by offering the agent a menu of contracts to choose from. In my model, the difference is that once effort is sunk, the agent has the opportunity to renegotiate his original by trading his claim on the firm in the market.
In the Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) model once the agent has chosen the contract, output is realized and the agent is paid according to the contract he has chosen. In their paper Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) show that with the possibility of renegotiation the principal cannot induce non-trivial pure strategies in the effort provision of the agent. When the effort choice is not observed by the principal, the anticipation of renegotiation may eliminate all incentives for the agent.
To avoid this result, the outcome of full insurance once the action is sunk must somehow be prevented. Avoiding this outcome is possible only if the principal remains unsure about which action the agent chose. If the principal knows for sure the agent's action, he can determine exactly the expected value of the underlying investment and insure the agent thereby saving a risk-premium. However if the agent is randomizing his choice over several actions, the principal is put in a position of an asymmetrically informed insurer at the renegotiation stage (Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) ). Hence, the complexity of the model comes from the fact that at the renegotiation stage the game switches from one of hidden action to one of hidden information.
The renegotiation stage in the game occurs after the agent's effort has been exerted, hence depending on the effort that the agent has taken, the agent chooses from a menu of compensation contracts offered by the principal. At this point the game becomes a standard adverse selection problem, where, by choosing from the menu that the principal offers, the agent reveals his type -here his effort choice. Two important observations must be made about the problem: the agent's cost of effort does not appear in the problem as it is a sunk at the renegotiation stage. Second, both types' individual rationality constraints may be binding here (Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) ).
The principal offers a menu of contracts that solves the compensation-costminimization problem of extracting informational rent from the agent that exerted model, except that the weights placed on them by the agent are different. Due to the randomization result, the probability of the agent exerting the high-cost action is less than one and the probability of the agent exerting the low-cost action is greater than zero. In this case the agent's benevolence lies in the assumption that the agent will take the high-cost action with the highest probability to avoid losses in production.
To be a bit more formal with the notation, Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) in the discrete case prove that the highest probability of high effort ) ( * c x that can be sustained in equilibrium is such that with the possibility of renegotiation, the principal cannot induce high effort as a pure non-degenerate strategy; rather the agent randomizes between high and low effort with a certain probability. As the agent gets his reservation utility whether he chooses the high or the low effort, he is indifferent between the two effort levels and hence it is presumed that the agent randomizes between them using ) ( * c x .
The point to note here is that only contracts that offer full insurance to type With this set-up, the solution of Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) can be replicated by endowing the manager with the standard second-best contract constructed using shares and cash and then after the action has been taken, the market maker can offer the agent to buy back the shares for the amount that would correspond to the part of the Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) menu offered to the agent who has taken the lowcost action. As this maximizes the utility of the residual claimants at the time the agent's action has been taken, it seems reasonable that the market maker would be willing to do so and the same equilibrium with the same allocations as in Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) would then emerge in this setting. Hence, with the agent's trades being publicly disclosed, the market maker can at best act as the principal in Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) and set prices such that he replicates the allocations in that model.
The Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) allocations may not be the optimal strategy
for the market maker in terms of his expected profit, but in terms of production, this is the best that can be achieved in this scenario -replication of the Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) allocations. In other words, being able to demonstrate that the solution to the problem where managers are not required to identify themselves can lead to improvement relative to Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) is equivalent to demonstrating that insider trading can provide economic benefits in a setting with diffused "weak"
shareholders. Thus, if the manager is required to identify himself, the optimal solution makes him trade on terms specific to him and not market prices so that the market maker can replicate the allocations in Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) . Of course then there is no point to using tradable securities as a means of compensation in this scenario as the securities offered to the agent in this case are not traded at market prices.
The model that I analyze is closer to the Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) model than to the one proposed by Ching-To and Ma (1994) where they look at a renegotiation model where the agent, rather than the principal proposes the renegotiation contract. My model is similar to theirs as in my model as well the principal does not offer to renegotiate with the agent due to diffused ownership, rather it is the agent that proposes the renegotiation (trading) of the contract. In the model by
Ching-To and Ma (1994) the agent offers the principal a menu of contracts. The principal will believe that the agent has taken the low-cost action if the agent offers the principal a full insurance contract at the renegotiation stage. Anticipating a rejection of his renegotiation offer, the agent chooses the high-cost action.
To restrict the multiplicity of equilibria, they impose a belief refinement which states that when the principal's initial contract and the agent's renegotiation contract support the same, unique best action for the agent, then the principal must believe that the agent has performed this action. This restriction on the beliefs of the principal allows them to get back the second-best allocation as a unique equilibrium. But, unlike their model, I do not restrict the principal's beliefs, and as I have established above, in my model I can replicate the Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) allocations when the agent is forced to publicly disclose his trades. Hence, in the rest of the paper, I
will benchmark the production results that I get in my model when the agent does not have to disclose with that of Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) .
Benchmark Case -"No Adverse Selection" Regime
I start my formal analysis by first focussing on a hypothetical benchmark case in which the manager can trade anonymously at market prices, but the market maker sets prices without considering the presence of an adverse selection problem in the market. Thus the agent who is informed about his effort choice has the option to trade his shares (as they are tradable) at their unconditional expected value. Stated differently, while I do introduce information asymmetry into the market here, the market maker here fails to recognize this and does not induce a spread in the market prices. Hence, in this benchmark case, prices are set such that ASK BID= . For lack of a better name, I label this the "no adverse selection" regime. Now suppose that the agent is endowed with * δ shares initially. Again, * δ is the agent's share-holdings in the standard full commitment contract that satisfies incentive compatibility given that the individual rationality constraint binds. The agent who has taken the high-cost action is compensated with * B at the end of the game if he continues to hold * δ shares. * B is constructed such that the individual rationality constraint of this type binds so that in equilibrium he gets his reservation utility. Hence, this contract is the same as the risky contract that is paid to an agent who has taken the high-cost action in the standard full commitment model. 
For this type of agent to settle on a contract that is incentive compatible (in addition to satisfying exactly individual rationality) through his own utility maximizing trading activities, the equilibrium market price, πˆ, must be such that the optimal holdings for this agent is exactly * δ shares. The following lemma establishes that the necessary condition in equilibrium for an agent who has taken the high-cost action will be to hold exactly * δ shares.
Lemma 1: A necessary condition for it to be optimal for an agent who has taken h a to continue to hold (exactly) * δ shares in the firm is that the price πˆ satisfies: 
His expected utility will be at the maximum when he holds exactly * δ shares if the first-order condition in ψ equals zero evaluated at
must be the marginal utility of the h a agent when H x = is the outcome that is realized is denoted
Lemma 1 established the necessary condition for the agent who has taken the high-cost action to hold exactly * δ shares in equilibrium. I now need to demonstrate that an agent who has taken the high-cost action is at his maximum utility when he holds exactly * δ shares in the firm and hence has no incentive to change his claim on the firm. The following lemma gives the sufficient condition for the agent who has taken the high-cost action will hold * δ shares in equilibrium.
Lemma 2: A sufficient condition for this contract to characterize the case where the agent who has taken h a is at his maximum utility when he continues to hold exactly * δ shares is for his expected utility function to be concave in δ everywhere. Lemma 3: The expected value of the firm is given by the expression
where σˆ is the equilibrium probability of high effort.
Proof: In this regime the market price πˆ is formed simply by the market maker's rational expectations on the final payoff which depend on the market maker's rational expectations on the probability of the agent taking the high-cost action when he randomizes. This can be calculated as a combination of the expected market price of the firm when the agent exerts high effort and the expected market price of the firm when the agent exerts low effort weighted by the equilibrium probability of high effort ) (σ and of low effort ) 1 ( σ − . Based on the market maker's expectation of the randomisation of effort by the agent the firm is priced at πˆ where
where σˆtakes the form that supports the price πˆthat satisfies the necessary condition established in Lemma 1in equilibrium.
I now need to demonstrate that when the h a agent receives this contract and exerts h a with a probability σˆhe is at the point where his utility is at the maximum.
This ensures that an agent who has taken h a has no incentive to buy or sell shares and hence continues to hold the * δ shares he has been awarded at the start of the game until the liquidation date. This is done by substituting the value of σˆ that has been calculated in the equilibrium condition of πˆ (Lemma 3) into the necessary equilibrium condition that has been found for the high-cost agent to hold * δ shares (Lemma 1). The following proposition gives the necessary and sufficient condition for the contract to hold in equilibrium.
Proposition 1: The necessary and sufficient condition for the second best contract with tradable securities to be renegotiation proof is gives the necessary condition to prove that in equilibrium the agent who has taken the low-cost action is indifferent between selling his shares and keeping them till the firm is liquidated. One point to note is that there is no short selling allowed by the insiders. B is constructed such that the individual rationality constraint binds for this type.
Proof: In order for it to hold in equilibrium that the agent who randomizes between taking the high-cost action and not trading, and taking the low-cost action and selling his shares, it must be that he is indifferent between the two actions. That is, his utility from the two actions should be equal. This condition can be written as
The incentive compatibility constraint for an agent who has taken the high-cost action is given by the expression
where the LHS of the equation is the utility of the agent if he takes the high-cost action less the differential cost of effort and the RHS is the utility of the agent if he takes the low-cost action. Both sides of the equation assume that the agent holds his shares until the liquidation date.
Hence it is true that the low-cost action agent is indifferent between holding his shares till the liquidation date and selling them. This is given by the following constraint
One point to note is that the cash component paid to the agent } *, { 0 B B B ∈ must be such that * B binds the individual rationality constraint for the agent who has taken the high-cost action whereas 0 B is constructed such that the individual rationality constraint binds for the agent who has taken the low-cost action and sells his shares. Also, the condition on the cash component is such that the agent randomizes between taking the high-cost action and keeping his shares in the firm and taking the low-cost action and selling his shares, that is, the agent is indifferent between the two actions as his utility is the same from both choices. Hence, the cash component is constructed so that both types of agent are at their reservation utility.
This means that the individual rationality constraint of both types of agent binds and hence 0 * B B > 4 . Now that I have established that the agent who has taken the lowcost action is indifferent between selling his shares and keeping them till the liquidation date, I now need to demonstrate that the low-cost agent will always choose to sell all his shares and not just a fraction of them.
Lemma 5: If 0 B satisfies Lemma 4 then the low-cost agent prefers to sell all his shares to only selling a portion.
Proof: Assume that the agent who has taken the low-cost action sells ψ shares of the total number of shares *) (δ that he was awarded at the beginning of the game. His 4 As noted earlier, I am working on formally proving that it is optimal for the cash components to be structured such that 0 * B B > .
utility from selling a portion of his shares and keeping a portion till the liquidation date can be given by the expression
The agent in this case is compensated with 0 B as at the liquidation date, he does not hold * δ shares in the firm and hence reveals that he is not the type who has exerted the high-cost action.
If instead the agent who exerted the low-cost action is given the certainty equivalent of the shares he holds rather than the lottery he receives when holding the shares till the liquidation date, his utility can be expressed as
Since the agent is risk averse his utility is higher with the certainty equivalent than with the lottery. This is expressed by the following inequality
On the other hand, if the agent who has taken the low-cost action sells all his shares, his expected utility is
, which implies that
The above inequality proves that the low-cost agent has a higher expected utility from selling all his shares rather than selling just a fraction of them.
Lemma 5 provides the sufficiency condition that holds if 0 B is constructed such that it satisfies Lemma 4 and the agent who has taken the low-cost action randomizes between holding his shares and selling all of them. Lemma 5 establishes that selling only a fraction of the shares results in inefficient risk sharing and hence it shows that no interior maximum exists when the agent who has taken the low-cost action holds a diversified portfolio. Rather, the agent who has taken the low-cost action has a higher expected utility from selling all his shares.
So far, I have established the necessary and sufficient conditions for the agent who has taken the high-cost action to hold his shares till the liquidation date and the conditions to prove that on the other hand, the agent that has taken the low-cost action is indifferent between holding all his shares and selling all his shares. With these conditions holding in equilibrium, the next lemma deals with the implications of setting prices such that the market maker ignores the adverse selection present in the market due to the low-cost action agent selling his shares.
This section overall deals with the hypothetical situation where the market maker does not respond to the information asymmetry in the market when setting prices. Hence prices in this regime are set as if there is no adverse-selection in the market. Accordingly, π≡ = ASK BID . The objective of the market maker in this game is simply to earn zero profit in expectation. To simplify matters algebraically I will assume that the market maker seeks to make an expected profit of zero on both the sells and the buys and not simply in aggregate. 5 The market maker sets prices such that he makes at best zero profit or less, but not a positive profit.
Lemma 6: In the "no-adverse selection" regime the market maker makes a negative profit overall.
Proof: Lemma 2 established that as the agent who has exerted h a is at his maximum utility, hence he has no incentive to change his shareholdings in the firm. On the other hand, the agent who has exerted l a gets a higher utility from selling his shares and hence he sells his shares and gets full insurance. Hence there are only liquidity traders in the buy side of the market and insider trading occurs only in the sell side of the market. In this regime, prices in the buy side of the market are set such that π= ASK so that the market maker makes zero profit on the buys, which results in
holding in equilibrium. On the sell side though, there are liquidity traders as well as informed traders. The market maker's profit from selling to both these parties is given by the following equation
In the "no adverse selection regime" π= BID hence the market maker makes no profit on the liquidity traders but looses money when he trades with informed traders as π π< l . Hence, overall, the market maker's profits in this regime are negative. As the market maker makes a negative profit in this regime it is hard to imagine that he would participate in such a regime. However, this regime is only serving as a hypothetical benchmark and is not suggestive of an equilibrium as the market maker would not participate.
Comparison of No Adverse Selection Regime with FT (1990)
In the above section I established that when the market-maker does not induce a bid-ask spread in the market and there are "weak principals" that do not offer to renegotiate with the agent, in equilibrium the agent will exert h a with a probabilityσˆwhen the equilibrium price of the firm is set at πˆby the market maker.
The randomization probability derived in the above artificial benchmark case can now be compared to the probability of high effort in Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) where a "strong principal" offers the agent a renegotiation-proof contract that induces the agent to randomize and exert the high effort with a probability 
where φ ′ here as in FT (1990) denotes the derivative of the inverse of the agent's utility function. For notational simplicity ))) (
Intuitively, the "no adverse selection" regime should do worse than Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) 
. This is a more extreme assumption, but it is instructive as it ensures that I get equivalence between the two models.
Looking at the equivalent expression in my model for where the agent has no incentive to trade in the market with "no adverse selection," the probability of high effort σˆ must satisfy ) ( model, that is, σ σ= FT . As expected, however, the model in this paper is always dominated by the Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) model and at best I can only achieve equivalence between the two models under extreme circumstances. Intuitively, allowing the agent the possibility to trade his compensation under "weak principals" that cannot offer to renegotiate with the agent due to diffused ownership lowers the agent's incentives to exert high effort. Only in the special where the agent's utility function has the shape where the slope of the ) (L U and ) (U U are the same and the probability of getting the high outcome given that the agent has exerted the low-cost action is close to zero, can I achieve equivalence between the two models. Hence, production is generally lower in my model where there are "weak principals" that offer the agent compensation in tradable securities and do not renegotiate with the agent as they do not have enough control or ownership.
Market with Adverse Selection
In this section, I take the model with "weak principals" and attempt to analyze market prices more closely to see how market prices affect production by the agent.
As the market maker in the previous section makes a negative profit when he ignores the information asymmetry and sets prices such that π= = ASK BID , he will not participate in that regime. In this section then, I allow the market maker to respond to the asymmetry of information introduced by the possibility of insider trading by setting prices such that there is a spread in the market, i.e. BID ASK > . The objective of the market maker in this game is simply to earn zero profit in expectation.
I rely on the simplifying assumption that the market maker seeks at best to make an expected profit of zero on both the sells and the buys and not simply in aggregate.
Since it is assumed that each informed trader trades only once and the prices are preset, they do not care how their trade affects the future price path.
The unconditional expected value of the firm that is supported when the agent in equilibrium exerts high effort with a probability * σ is . The following two lemmas give the equilibrium prices that are set by the market maker. As discussed earlier, in the second-best contract with full commitment the agent exerts the high-cost effort with probability one, whereas in the Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) model as the agent randomizes between high and low effort, he performs the high-cost action with a probability less than one. The idea in this model is to try to get the randomizing probability of high effort as close to one as possible and hence get as close to the production generated in the full commitment model. Hence, even though multiple equilibria could exist in this regime with adverse selection, the particular one that I am interested in is the one that supports the highest probability of high effort ( * σ ).
Lemma 7: To sustain h a in equilibrium with the highest probability possible, it must be that the market maker sets π= BID .
Proof: To get * σ as high as possible the market maker sets the bid price to be as high as possible without creating an incentive for the agent taking The previous two lemmas have established the equilibrium prices set by the market maker in both the sell and buy side of the market. Now, I need to prove that when the market maker imposes a spread in the market, he is able to at best make zero profit. Hence, the following lemma now proves that the equilibrium conditions needed so that the market maker is expectation makes zero profit on both sells and buys leads to the result that σ σ* > . σ is closer to the standard full commitment secondbest contract with moral hazard thanσˆ. As σ σ* > , if the market maker makes zero profit on both the sell and the buy side and imposes a spread in the market the economy as a whole is better off with inefficient prices as production increases.
The intuition behind the production efficiency gain result is that the agent who has exerted high effort has no incentive to trade in the market as long spread, the market maker can insure himself of the losses he will incur by buying from insiders. Due to the fact that there is only inside selling, the market maker can set the ask price at the true conditional value of the firm. In order for the market maker to make zero profit on the sell price of the firm, the expected value of the firm * π must be higher than that in the "no adverse selection regime." As a result of having to sustain the increased expected unconditional value * π the incentives for taking the high-cost action are increased. Hence, in equilibrium, the agent takes the high-cost action with a greater probability.
It is true that when the low-cost agent sells his shares the liquidity traders lose money on their trades. This is not an issue that is unique to this paper, but is common to the literature. Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) Pareto improvement due to the increased production and hence these gains can be reallocated by a redistribution method such as taxation, fees, etc. As the focus of this paper is not on allocation issues, I do not explicitly design a redistribution mechanism, but as there is an increase in production with no adverse risk sharing, this efficiency gain can be redistributed to the liquidity traders (provided they are risk neutral) so that in equilibrium they are not worse off.
Comparison of Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) and Adverse Selection Regime
As I have already established that in the model where there are "weak principals" that do not offer to renegotiate with the agent and the market-maker responds to the information asymmetry in the market by imposing a bid-ask spread that the probability of high effort with allowing for anonymous insider trading is higher than the probability of high effort in a market with no bid-ask spread. That is σ σ* > . Also, in the limiting case analysed in the previous section σ σ= offer to renegotiate with the agent but the market maker imposes a spread in market prices. In this case, allowing the agent to engage in insider trading results in an increase in production that leads to a Pareto improvement where the economy as a whole is better off.
Conclusion and Implications
The debate on insider trading has mainly focussed on what constitutes appropriate regulation from a public policy standpoint. It is an issue that cannot be resolved easily as insider trading generates both positive and negative externalities, and hence the magnitude of these externalities must be known before a conclusion can be reached. This paper attempts to contribute to this disclosure debate from a theoretical standpoint by looking at the externalities of compensating managers with The model presented in this paper has some direct implications for regulation on the disclosure of executive shareholdings and trading activities. The paper shows that when there are "weak principals" who do not own or control a sufficiently large fraction of the firm to be able to renegotiate with the agent and there exists adverse selection in the market, under certain conditions anonymity of trading leads to production efficiency gains and to an overall increase of wealth in the economy.
Hence, I would argue that in these situations, welfare would be increased if regulation did not require companies to fully disclose executive shareholdings and trading activities as giving managers the freedom to change the risk potential of their contract through engaging in insider trading leads to greater production. If regulators in these situations imposed public disclosure of this private information it would lead to lower production. 
